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Abstract
In polygyny, the fact that some men take several wives deprives
others. This crowding-out has a distinct age dimension: the remarry-
ing men are older. In monogamy, on the other hand, men marry once
and, under reasonable assumptions, when young. We study the impli-
cations of this age-heterogeneity in a two-sex overlapping generations
model, where agents live for two adult periods. Men are fecund in
both periods while women only in the first one. We model restrictions
on polygyny as a restriction on resources that old men can devote
to a new family. Such restrictions result in more women choosing
young, i.e., previously unmarried, men. If young men respond to their
enhanced familial role by reallocating time from leisure activities to




Our model thus captures a link from legal constraints on polygyny to
economic development. We argue that the mechanism and results fit
with stylized facts of polygyny over time and in the cross-section.
Keywords: Polygyny, Spousal Age Gap, Male Time Allocation, Human
Capital Investments, Economic Development.
1 Introduction
Many ancient civilizations did no limit the number of wives a man could take
– his wealth and inclination would dictate that number. Fast forward to our
time and we find that most countries limit polygyny. And despite the obser-
vation that polygyny allocates women efficiently [Becker, 1991], this (static)
efficiency has failed to give polygynous societies an edge over monogamous
ones in terms of economic growth. In fact, the cross-sectional comparison
is no kinder to polygyny than the time-series one. To state the obvious,
advanced industrialized countries today are invariably monogamous.
The direction of causality, if any, is a matter of debate. For instance, fea-
tures of development may promote the endogenous emergence of monogamy,
e.g., more emphasis on quality over quantity of offspring and thus a greater
premium on high-quality wives [Gould et al., 2008]. More controversially,
monogamy may promote “modernization” – the apparent belief of, e.g., East
Asian nationalist leaders who in the first half of the 20th century embraced
Western style family law [Goode, 1970].
This paper advances a novel argument for why monogamy is positively
related to economic development and argue that the causality runs both
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ways: greater technological change prompts more monogamy; and imposing
monogamy can raise the steady-state human capital level.
Polygyny entails a displacement effect: the more wives are taken by one
group of men, the fewer are left for others, e.g., the rich elite vs. the poor non-
elite [Lagerlo¨f, 2010, de la Croix and Mariani, 2012]. Our focus is on the age
dimension of this displacement. In principle, a polygynous man could take
multiple wives instantaneously, but that is rarely the case. Instead, wives
are added sequentially, and with a fair amount of spacing. Women, on the
other hand, irrespective of marriage regime, tend to marry young, consistent
with women’s more age-limited fecundity (and marriage as a contract on
children borne by the wife [Posner, 1992]). Goody [1973, pages 10-11] wrote:
“Polygyny, which is so widespread a feature of African marriage, is made
possible largely by the differential marriage age, early for girls, later for men.”
Hakansson [1989, page 125, and associated references] noted for East Africa:
“Between father and son there is considerable disagreement about incoming
bridewealth cattle, since the family head will often use his authority over the
herd for his own benefit instead of contributing to his sons’ marriage cattle.”
In fact, such intergenerational conflicts of interest are a staple of polygyny.
The prevention of old men from taking an extra wife (i.e., the prohibition of
polygyny) improves the young man’s prospects of marrying (monogamously,
since he is previously unmarried).
We formulate an overlapping-generations (OLG) growth model where
men transfer human capital to their issue (sons or grand-sons). Male mar-
riage age (women always marry young) matters for two reasons. First, we
let technological change influence the relative importance of old and young
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men’s human capital, where greater rate of change increases the value of
young men’s human capital. Assuming that women are allocated (or allo-
cate themselves) according to the value of men’s human capital, more rapid
technological change leads to a greater portion of young men marrying, and,
consequently, a higher degree of monogamy in equilibrium.
Second, and key to our result that monogamy can be a vector of growth,
not just its reflection, we assume that young and old men differ in their time
use. While old men allocate their time between investment in (grand-)child
human capital and work, young men are allowed a third activity that is not
productive, e.g., leisure. This assumption captures the mechanism that we
want to model: when young men do not marry, they do not have children, and
therefore devote less time and resources to children’s education. As a result,
steady-state human capital levels are higher in environments restricting old
men’s ability to remarry. Put another way, monogamy boosts human capital
through pulling young men from leisure to human capital investments in the
young. Thus, we differ from Tertilt [2005], where the growth retarding effects
of polygyny operated through its effect on the value of daughters (relative to
savings).
For ease of exposition, we simply assume such age-asymmetric time allo-
cation, but our model also allows for this asymmetry to arise endogenously
(see Appendix B) since old men who do not marry may already have chil-
dren (from a marriage when young) and thus grandchildren on whom they
can spend their time; whereas young men who do not marry remain without
issue (for at least one period).
The observation that vintage matters when technological change is rapid
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is not new to our paper. It has been used to explain intergenerational mobility
[Galor and Tsiddon, 1997] and the growth and decline of firms [Greenwood
and Jovanovic, 1999, Hobijn and Jovanovic, 2001, Jovanovic and Rousseau,
2003].
Young unmarried men’s being trouble forms the key link from restrictions
on polygyny to growth, and thus relates our paper to the literature on the
civilizing effect of marriage of men [Akerlof, 1998] (ranging from the so called
marriage premium [Korenman and Neumark, 1991] to crime [Sampson et al.,
2006]); as well as the above mentioned notion that monogamy pacifies.
Our focus on a possible rationale for regulating the number of wives a
man may take – other than as a populist measure – including the special
case of monogamy, is a departure from the existing Economics literature
where the marriage institution is either taken as given, or is viewed as an
outcome. However, the notion that limits on male re-partnering ability, from
e.g., female strategic behavior, could redirect male efforts towards parental
investment (by limiting the returns from partner search), is well established
in Evolutionary Biology [Trivers, 1972, Maynard Smith, 1977].
1.1 Brief Polygyny Background
Scholars concur that primitive societies did not limit the number of wives a
man could take [Engels, 1972, first published in 1884, Murdock, 1967, Mur-
dock and White, 1969, Pison, 1986] and that the prevalence of polygyny has
declined over history [Becker, 1991, Goody, 1973, 1976], partly curtesy of the
spread of Christianity and Islam (religions that limit the number of concur-
rent wives, a feature they share with Hinduism and Western Jewry since the
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11th century). Whether limitations on polygyny came with the package deal
or were integral to these religions’ appeal can be debated. Be that as it may,
an explicit embrace of monogamy can be found in the adoption of Western
inspired family law in many, notably East Asian, countries. Moreover, in the
case of Japan (Meiji restoration) [MacFarlane, 2002, Fuess, 2004] and China
(Republican family code) [Bernhardt, 1999] removal of the legal recognition
of concubines was part of a deliberate effort to modernize society and to close
the economic gap with the West [Goode, 1970, MacFarlane, 2002].
While polygyny (under balanced sex ratios) could be maintained through
life-long bachelorhood, that is rarely the case [Goody, 1976]. Instead, polyg-
ynous societies are characterized by men’s marrying late, and women’s mar-
rying early and remaining married, if not to the same person, through their
fecund years. As a result, spousal age gaps are large and the remarriage rates
of widowed or divorced women are high (for Sub-Saharan Africa, see Pison
[1986], Dorjahn [1958], Garenne and Walle [1989], Hayase and Liaw [1997],
Klomegah [1997], Timaeus and Reynar [1998], Lardoux and Walle [2003],
Coast [2006], Gibson and Mace [2007], Gray et al. [2007] and for Australian
Aborigines, see Keen [1982], Chisholm and Burbank [1991]). Clearly, men
marry younger women throughout the world. However, the age gap in Eu-
rope (monogamous) has traditionally been small [Hajnal, 1965], and Africa
(polygynous) remains the continent with the highest average age gap (UN:
World Marriage Patterns 2000).
(Population growth, rendering younger cohorts larger, allows for universal
polygyny, but also hinges crucially on spousal age gaps.)
A prediction of the model is that the rate of technological change affects
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the relative value of young and old men’s human capital, where old men hold
an advantage in technologically stagnant societies. Interestingly, primitive
(technologically stagnant) societies appear to have been gerontocratic. The
mechanism through which old men dominated young men (and thus achieved
polygyny) was either old men’s advantage in terms of their privileged religious
roles (e.g., through the upholding of prescribed initiation rites, ability to
invoke supernatural power, etc.) [Garenne and Walle, 1989, Gray et al.,
2007, Keen, 1982, Wilson, 2008] and/or through control over the material
means through which brides were obtained, e.g., cattle among pastoralists
[Goody, 1973, Hakansson, 1989].
An important assumption underpinning our result that restrictions on
polygyny can boost steady-state human capital is that marriage makes men
invest more in the human capital of the young and that the first marriage
matters more than subsequent marriages. In other words, having one child
with certainty (i.e., for young men, marriage) brings about a larger change in
lifestyle than additional increments in offspring. Time use studies from the
West indicate that the arrival of children reduces leisure time substantially
(both sexes), e.g., [Korenman et al., 2005], and ethnographic studies from
Africa suggest that unmarried young men are often kept at arms length from
the young (and, perhaps, not incidentally, their mothers) [Gray et al., 2007,
Borgerhoff Mulder, 1989].
Absence of marriage need not imply that unmarried men do not con-
tribute to the human capital of the young, at the very least, they are likely
to have nephews and nieces. However, the evolution of marriage and the
higher prevalence of patriarchal over matriarchal societies suggest that high
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paternity certainty (marriage) may be an important trigger of male invest-
ments in the young, e.g., [Alexander, 1974].
In nonhuman species, polygyny correlates with little or no paternal in-
vestment [Low, 1988], whereas monogamy is characterized by high paternal
investment. In the words of Maynard Smith [1977, page 2]: “...once ...the
male has nothing to gain by desertion [remarriage]...he would increase his
fitness by investing [in offspring survival]”.
Returning to evidence from our own species, within a society, children in
polygynous families tend to experience worse outcomes (mortality: Strass-
mann [38], Omariba and Boyle [2007], Gyimah [2009]; anthropometric mea-
sures: Sellen [1999], Hadley [2005]), for an exception, see Gibson and Mace
[2007]. The interpretation of these findings is, however, complicated by sort-
ing across family types.
In fact, our model’s prediction that human capital moves inversely with
the degree of polygyny is for differences across, not within, societies. As
mentioned, comparative studies reveal clearly that more monogamous soci-
eties also have higher human capital. A simple reason may be that, under
polygyny, father’s time gets spread more thinly, and there is some indirect
evidence supporting this hypothesis. Among societies in Murdock’s Ethno-
graphic Atlas, male initiation rights were found to be more common where
the typical family type was conjectured to allow for less father-child interac-
tion (e.g., co-residing co-wives vs. co-wives residing in separate quarters), and
the initiation rite itself was hypothesized to stem from a relatively low level
of paternal involvement in (male) children’s upbringing [Kitahara, 1974].
Arguably, cross-cultural comparisons do not hold constant many impor-
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tant determinants of human capital. This objection cannot be fully over-
come but limiting our attention to Sub-Saharan Africa (using data from the
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)) Figures 1 and 2 show that across
countries, the extent of monogamy correlates negatively with juvenile mortal-
ity and positively with primary-school completion rate. (The DHS samples
married women and their households. This, combined with the fact that
marriage is near universal for women during their reproductive years, makes
for measuring monogamy through the female side. We choose the percent of
married women who do not have a co-wife, following [Hartung, 1982]. This
measure is one of a number of candidates, but fortunately, there is a high
level of covariance between the various measures [Low, 1988].)
2 The Model
Consider the following OLG model. All agents live for three periods: as
children, and as young and old (adults). In each period t there are Pt young
men, and Pt young women.
There is no inequality within generations, only between young and old
(of a given sex). This allows us to capture the age dimension of polygyny,
as discussed earlier, and also eliminates the need to model different social
classes.1
Marriage is for the purpose of procreation. Only young women can bear
children, and, by implication, marry. Each young woman bears n sons and n
1For recent examples of marriage market models with both male and female hetero-
geneity see de la Croix and Mariani [2012] and Mariani [2012].
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daughters; thus Pt+1 = nPt. As for men, both old and young men are fecund.
They invest in their sons’ and grandsons’ human capital.
Let zt denote the fraction of the Pt young women who marry young men
in period t. Thus, a fraction 1 − zt of these women marry old men. Since
there are fewer marriageable women than men, a very literal interpretation
is that all men (young and old) have less than one wife. This is an artifact of
the representative agent approach. A more liberal (and useful) interpretation
is that young men have a probability less than one of taking a wife; that men
marry later than women do; or equivalently, a woman could have several
reproductive years which can be divided. An interesting feature of this setting
is that a higher zt can be thought of as a smaller spousal age gap, as well
as a higher probability of a young man’s marrying, which in turn can be
interpreted as a more monogamous marriage pattern.
2.1 Human capital investment
A boy’s human capital depends on the human capital of his father and grand-
father (if any), and how much time they spend on his education.
Women do not have human capital in our model. This assumption is in-
nocuous. Since all mothers are of the same age and all children have equally
many mothers (1/2n), maternal human capital input would not have a differ-
ential effects on children’s human capital. Neither is this assumption unreal-
istic. In polygynous societies girls receive little human capital investment or
bequests in the form of physical capital or land [Goody, 1973, 1976, Hartung,
1982].
Let the human capital of a young (adult) man in period t (born in period
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t− 1) be denoted ht.
Men could in principle have different amounts of human capital depending
on the father’s age, but (to anticipate events) since women choose husbands
to maximize their sons’ human capital, all boys receive equal human capital
investments in equilibrium.
The value of the father’s input in his sons’ education depends on when
the father’s human capital was accumulated. More precisely, we let AOh
α
t−1
be the value of the educational time of an old man (an old father or a grand-
father), where AO > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1). A young father’s educational time is
worth AY h
α
t , where AY > 0. We can think of AY and AO as capturing the
effect that technological progress has on human capital of different agents. In
environments where technology changes rapidly, AY is large relative to AO;
in more stagnant environments, experience matters more and AY is small
relative to AO.
2.1.1 Boys with an old father
Let hO,t+1 be the human capital of a boy who has an old father, and thus no
grandfather. Recall that an old father (in period t) has human capital ht−1,
and that AOh
α
t−1 is the value of his educational time.
Old men spend a fraction ρ ∈ (0, 1) of their time with their own young
children and thus away from their grandchildren. Here we treat ρ as an
exogenous parameter. (A different model could let this variable be chosen
by the old man.) We interpret a low ρ as monogamy being imposed more
strictly, in the sense that old men are required to spend a lot of time with
their existing families and restricted in their ability to remarry and practice
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“serial monogamy.”2
Recall also that a fraction 1−zt of the young women marry old men, and
that there are Pt−1 old men and Pt = Pt−1n young women. Thus the old












where we simplify the notation by letting






2.1.2 Boys with a young father
Let hY,t+1 be the human capital of a boy by a young father. What complicates
the analysis is that hY,t+1 depends on the father’s time, but possibly also on
that of the grandfather’s. Since agents only live for three periods, the only
children with living grandfathers are those whose father and grandfather were
both young at the time of fatherhood.
Recall that AY h
α
t is the value of the young father’s educational time. He




If a grandfather is alive, his total time is worth AOh
α
t−1, and he spends a
fraction 1− ρ of this time with his grandchildren. He has nzt−1 sons (reared
2Different from de la Croix and Mariani [2012] old women here have no value on the
marriage market, since they cannot have children. In that sense our model does not
distinguish between serial monogamy and polygyny.
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when he was young), each of whom has nzt sons, making for a total of n
2ztzt−1





Recall that a fraction zt−1 of young men in period t were themselves
fathered by young men, and therefore have living fathers, whereas the re-
maining 1− zt−1 have no living father. Women allocate themselves between
these two categories of young men – those with and those without living
fathers – thus equalizing the human capital levels between the two groups.














Intuitively, this is the same as the expected human capital of each boy
if mothers were to choose randomly between the two categories of young
men, thus getting a full grandfather with probability zt−1 and none with
probability 1− zt−1.











Young women allocate themselves between young and old men aiming to
maximize their sons’ human capital. This implies that the human capital
levels of sons of young and old fathers (hY,t+1 and hO,t+1) must equalize; else
women would move from young to old men (if hY,t+1 < hO,t+1), or from old to
young (if hY,t+1 > hO,t+1). As a result, within a cohort, men’s human capital
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levels are identical in equilibrium, and we can let ht+1 = hY,t+1 = hO,t+1














Since the left-hand side is decreasing in zt and the right-hand side is increasing
in zt, (6) defines a unique equilibrium level of zt on the interval (0, 1).
2.3 Steady state
The steady-state level of zt, denoted z, is given by setting zt = zt−1 = z and
ht = ht−1 = h in (6). Therefore
z =
(1− ρ)(1− γ) + γn
1− γ + γn
. (7)
The associated steady-state level of human capital, h, is given by the second















2.4 Results in the baseline model
We can now sum up the properties of the baseline model in a couple of results
that follow immediately from (7) and (8).
Result 1 z is increasing in n
This result has a very simple intuition. When the population grows
rapidly there are more young men around, so more women choose to marry
young men.
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Result 2 z is increasing in γ
This result is also perfectly intuitive: raising γ amounts to raising the
value of young men’s knowledge, which induces more women to marry young
men. From (7) we also see that z = 1 − ρ when γ = 0: when young men’s
knowledge is worthless, young men only attract women because of their role
as grandfathers, which they are for a fraction 1−ρ of their time. Conversely,
z = 1 when γ = 1.
Result 3 z is decreasing in ρ
This result is also very intuitive: a higher ρ means that old men are
allowed to invest more in the children from their latest marriage, rather than
grandchildren, making it relatively more attractive for a woman to choose an
old man. From (7) we also note that z = γn/(1− γ + γn) when ρ = 1; even
when old men play no role as grandfathers, young men still attract some
women (as long as γ > 0). We also note that z = 1 when ρ = 0 (which
amounts to old men not being allowed to remarry).
Result 4 h is increasing in γ for n > 1
The intuition behind this result has to do with the fact that n determines
the relative number of old and young men. An increase in γ amounts to a
reallocation of resources from old to young men. When there are more young
than old men, n > 1, the net effect is positive.
Result 5 h is independent of ρ
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This result follows from the assumption that women allocate themselves
to equalize human capital of boys fathered by young and old men. Allowing
old men to spend more time with their second-marriage children (i.e., raising
ρ) leads to a reallocation of women from young to old men, and an associated
dilution of old men’s time. The allocation of old men’s educational time is
in that sense neutral in steady-state.
Result 5 hinges on the assumption that (old and young) men allocate a
fixed amount of time to their children’s education. This is altered if we allow
for a link from young men’s marital success to how much time they allocate
to their children’s education. Such a mechanism is explored below.
2.5 Alternative activities for young men
Thus far we have assumed that men invest all of their time endowment in
their sons. We now relax this assumption by letting young men allocate
time between investing in their children and pursuing some non-productive
activity, e.g., leisure. Old men, by contrast, spend all of their time with their
children and grandchildren (in Appendix B we endogenize this choice and
show that it holds under reasonable assumptions).
We also assume that the greater the number of children that young men
have, the more they care about the total amount of time spent with those
children.3 A similar assumption is often made in the literature on endoge-
nous fertility, where the intergenerational discount factor is decreasing in the
number of children, e.g., [Barro and Becker, 1989, Becker et al., 1990, Jones
3More generally, since each woman has a fixed number of children we could assume
that young men’s time allocation depends on their number of wives.
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and Schoonbroodt, 2010]. Here changes in young men’s preferences and be-
havior stem not from changes in fertility per woman, but from the young
men’s marital status.
To capture this in the simplest setting we can think of, we let the prefer-
ences of a young man take the following form:
Umt = [1− τ(nzt)] ln(1− lt) + τ(nzt) ln lt, (9)
where lt denotes the total amount of time that a young father spends with
his nzt children, and τ(nzt) is the utility weight on time invested in children,
where τ ′(nzt) > 0. In this formulation young fathers care directly about the
time spent with children, rather than the children’s human capital. Analyti-
cally, this is the simplest way to capture the mechanism we are interested in
while minimizing the differences from the baseline setting.
Solving the maximization problem in (9) it is straightforward to see that
optimal lt simply equals τ(nzt). To further simplify the analysis, we let τ(nzt)
take this functional form:
τ(nzt) = δ(nzt)
1−ε, (10)
where (ε, δ) ∈ [0, 1]2. We also assume that δn1−ε ≤ 1 to ensure that τ(nzt) ∈
[0, 1] for all allowed zt.












where the only difference with (5) is that the young father’s total amount
of time spent with children now equals δ(nzt)
1−ε rather than one. Setting
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δ = ε = 1 brings us back to the base-case formulation. If ε = 0, then the
young father spends δ time per child, regardless of how many children he
has.
Equating hY,t+1 in (11) to hO,t+1 in (1) and imposing steady state, we can
write the equation determining the steady-state fraction of women marrying










Given the z defined in (12), the steady-state human capital level, h, can be
computed from (8).
2.5.1 Results in the extended model
Generally, we cannot solve explicitly for either z or h and the proofs of these
results in the extended setting are in Appendix C.
Results 1 to 3 still hold, identically to the baseline model. Results 4 and
5 differ and are now replaced by the following:
Result 6 h is increasing in γ for large enough n
This resembles Result 4, and the intuition is also similar: raising γ real-
locates resources from old to young. If n is large more children are educated
by young fathers. However, the threshold for n is no longer equal to one.
The difference is that young men invest less time in children than old men –
they have the same time endowment, but invest part of it in non-productive
activities – countervailing the positive effect on h of an increase in γ.
Result 7 h is decreasing in ρ for small enough ε
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To illustrate Result 7, consider the case where ε = 0, i.e., a young father
spends a fixed amount of time δ per child, regardless of how many children
he has.
Now consider the two extreme polygyny regimes: ρ = 0, old men cannot
commit any time to young children; ρ = 1, old men are unrestricted in their
time allocation between young children and grandchildren.


















Comparing equations (14) and (13) it is clear that (13) is greater than
(14). That is, steady-state human capital is greater under monogamy.
The intuition for Result 7 is that a lower ρ reallocates old men’s time
toward their grandchildren, allowing more young men to marry and be drawn
into child human capital production. The lower is ε, the stronger is this effect.
When ε = 1, the effect is absent since the number of children has no bearing
on time use.
3 Discussion
It is well established that male (relative to female) heterogeneity can drive
polygyny [Becker, 1991]. Such male heterogeneity can be modeled in different
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ways. One is to assume the presence of a political elite. Here, instead, we let
age be the source of heterogeneity, using an OLG framework, where human
capital, technological change, and rules regulating the ease with which old
men may re-marry, are the central determinants of the power balance between
young and old men.
If the male behavioral response to marriage depends on age, then the
allocation of young women can have interesting implications for economic
development. In particular, old men’s inability to take young wives may have
less of an adverse effect on their behavior than young men’s being deprived
the same.
In our model, age-asymmetric behavioral responses to marriage oppor-
tunities arise endogenously. Old men may have married when young and
thus have grandchildren (as well as an old wife), on whom they can spend
time and resources. Young men, by contrast, have fewer outlets for such
investments. Consequently, limiting old men’s abilities to remarry can – by
improving young men’s marriage market and thus converting bachelors to
married men – lead to a rise in steady-state human capital.
In a, perhaps for an advanced society, more realistic model, there could
also be reasons why young men might choose to delay marriage. For example,
they may want to invest in their own human capital (and those investments
may be done with a view toward the marriage market). In that case, late
marriage (and possibly polygyny) need not be deleterious to growth.
In conclusion, the merits of our result that restrictions on polygyny can
drive development hinges crucially on the notion that reallocating a young
woman from an old to a young man raises investments in child human capital.
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In other words, extending marriage on the extensive margin does more toward
tipping men’s time allocation in the direction of investment in the young,
than increasing marriage on the intensive margin. A possible rationale might
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APPENDIX
A Heterogeneity between young men
Let a fraction xt of those ztPt women who marry young men choose a man
with a living father; the remaining fraction, 1 − xt, choose a young man
without a living father.
Consider first a young man without a living father. A total of zt(1−
xt)Pt women marry men in this category. Recall that a fraction 1 − zt−1
of the women in the previous period married an old man; thus there are
(1− zt−1)Pt men who have no living fathers in period t. Therefore, each man
in this category has zt(1 − xt)Pt/{(1 − zt−1)Pt} wives, each of whom has n




sons. This father divides his unit time endowment equally among his sons.
The human capital of a son fathered by a young man without a living father,















Consider next a young man with a living father. A total of ztxtPt
women marry men in this category. A fraction zt−1 of the women in the
previous period married young men, so there are zt−1Pt young men who have
living fathers. Thus, each man in this category has ztxtPt/{zt−1Pt} wives,





sons. The grandfather is here taken to have been an average young man in
the previous period, implying that he had zt−1 wives. He thus fathered nzt−1
sons in the previous period, and each of these sons has nztxt/zt−1 sons; recall






grandsons. The human capital of a son fathered by a young man with a
























For women to be indifferent between young men with and without living

























Multiplying through by (1− xt)xt we find that
zt−1(1− xt) (QY,t +QO,t) = (1− zt−1) xtQY,t, (A9)
or, rearranging,
zt−1 (QY,t +QO,t) = xt [QY,t + zt−1QO,t] . (A10)
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Diving by xt and using the expressions for hY W,t+1 and hY N,t+1 in (A8) we
obtain
hY W,t+1 = hY N,t+1 =
zt−1 (QY,t +QO,t)
xt
= QY,t + zt−1QO,t. (A11)
From (A6) and (A7) we then see that (A11) gives the expression for hY,t+1
in (4).
B Time allocation of young and old men
Let nY,t and nO,t denote the total number of children and grandchildren that
young and old men have, respectively. We let the preferences of men take
this form:
Umt = [1− τ(nY,t)] ln(1− lY,t) + τ(nY,t) ln lY,t
+β {[1− τ(nO,t+1)] ln(1− lO,t+1) + τ(nO,t+1) ln lO,t+1} .
(A12)
where β > 0, lY,t is the total amount of time that a young father spends with
his nY,t children, and τ(nY,t) is the utility weight on time invested in these
children, where τ ′(x) > 0. Similarly, lO,t+1 is the total amount of time that
the same man spends with his nO,t+1 children and grandchildren when old,
where τ(nO,t+1) is the utility weight on time spend with these children and
grandchildren.
We here assume that old men care only about the total amount of time
spent with children and grandchildren and are indifferent about its compo-
sition, which is still regulated by the exogenous parameter ρ. There would
be no qualitative differences in our results if we relax this assumption by e.g.
letting the argument inside τ(·) for old men be a linear combination of his
number of children and grandchildren.
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Maximizing utility in (A12) it is straightforward to see that lY,t = τ(nY,t)
and lO,t+1 = τ(nO,t+1); since this holds in all periods we can also write
lO,t = τ(nO,t). To find expressions for nY,t and nO,t, first recall that a fraction
zt of the women in period t marry young men and each woman has n children.
It follows that
nY,t = nzt. (A13)
A man who is old in period t has nzt−1 children from his first marriage, each
of whom has nzt children, making a total of n
2zt−1zt grandchildren. He also
takes n(1− zt) wives when old, each of whom has n children. It thus follows
that his total number of children and grandchildren equals
nO,t = n
2(1− zt) + n
2zt−1zt = n
2[1− zt(1− zt−1)]. (A14)
We now let τ(·) take this functional form:
τ(x) = min{1, δx1−ε}, (A15)
where x represents the number of children (and grandchildren) as given by
(A13) or (A14), and where (ε, δ) ∈ [0, 1]2. We next assume that










We immediately see from (A15), (A17) and zt ≤ 1 that δ < δ implies
that τ(nY,t) = δ(nzt)
1−ε < 1. Thus, young men always spend some time in
non-productive activities, so that changes in their marriage market success
(zt) affects their time spent with children.
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where nO denotes the steady-state level of nO,t. Note that z(1− z) is maxi-
mized at z = 1/2, implying that z(1−z) ≤ 1/4 and n2[1−z(1−z)] ≥ (3/4)n2.
Thus, if δ [(3/4)n2]
1−ε
> 1, then the inequality in (A18) must hold; from
(A17) we see that this is equivalent to δ > δ.
Finally we need to ensure that there exists some interval on which δ can






< nε−1 = δ, (A19)





To sum up, since old men spend no time in non-productive activities the
human capital of children fathered by old men is given by (1). Children
fathered by young men receive human capital investments analogous to (5)
but adjusted for the father’s time spent with his children, as given by (11).
C Proofs of Results 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7











and θ is a vector of exogenous parameters: θ = (γ, ρ, n, δ, ε)′.
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Below we prove Results 1 through 3 for the general case where (δ, ε) ∈
[0, 1]2. Since setting δ = ε = 1 brings us back to the baseline setting, it follows
that all the proofs of Results 1 through 3 are applicable to that setting as
well.
C.1 Proof of Result 1







where subindexes denote partial derivatives. We begin by examining the sign













where we note that J(z; θ) = J˜(z; θ)/n2. We also note that J˜n(z; θ) > 0,











where the second equality uses the fact that z is defined from J(z; θ) =














Using (A22), (A24), and (A25), we see that dz/dn > 0.
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C.2 Proofs of Results 2 and 3






































































C.3 Proof of Result 6











































where the last equality uses (A30). Since Jz(z; θ) < 0, it follows that
d lnh/dγ > 0 is equivalent to
(1− γ)Jγ(z; θ) > −(1 − z)Jz(z; θ). (A34)
From (A28) we see that




Using (A25) we can write






































Inserting (A37) into (A36) we obtain





























> (1− ρ)(1− γ). (A39)
Recall from Result 1 that z is increasing in n. It can also be seen from
(A23) that limn→∞ z = 1. Thus, the left-hand side of (A39) is monotonically
increasing in n and approaches positive infinity as n goes to infinity. The
right-hand side is constant. It follows that, for large enough n, the inequality
in (A39) holds and thus d lnh/dγ > 0. [Recall also that δ(nz)1−ε ≤ 1 must
hold for the time young agents spend away from children to be non-negative,
i.e., τ(nz) = δ(nz)1−ε ≤ 1. However, we can let δ and n both change in such
a way that δn1−ε is constant and less than one, ensuring that δ(nz)1−ε ≤ 1
holds, while δn2−ε = n (δn1−ε) goes to infinity.]
C.4 Proof of Result 7
We restrict attention to the case when ε = 0. If we can show that d lnh/dρ <
0 for ε = 0, then continuity ensures that the inequality must hold also for
some ε > 0 sufficiently close to zero. Using (8) and (A31) we can write the






































Recall from (A25) and (A29) that Jz(z; θ) < 0 and Jρ(z; θ) < 0. From this it
follows that the inequality in (A40) is equivalent to (1−z)Jz(z; θ) > ρJρ(z; θ),
which in turn can be written:
ρJρ(z; θ)− (1− z)Jz(z; θ) < 0. (A41)
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Next we show that the inequality in (A41) is equivalent to z > 1− ρ, for
ε = 0. First, setting ε = 0 in (A25) gives








































Using (A42) and (A43) it follows that (A41) becomes
























[(1− ρ) (1− z)− ρz]
= 1−γ
(nz)2
[(1− ρ)− (1− ρ) z − ρz]
= 1−γ
(nz)2
[1− ρ− z] < 0,
(A44)
which is equivalent to z > 1 − ρ. Finally, we show that z > 1− ρ holds. To
show this we use the definition of z, i.e., J(z; θ) = 0, where J(z; θ) is given
in (A21). Note that













which together with Jz(z; θ) < 0 [see (A25)] implies that z > 1 − ρ. It thus
follows that ρJρ(z; θ)− (1− z)Jz(z; θ) < 0, and that d lnh/dρ < 0.
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